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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issues to be determined are as follows: 
1. Was sufficient evidence introduced to support a finding 
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? 
2. Was inadmissible evidence introduced at trial, specifi-
cally an allegation that the defendant participated in the 
exchange of narcotics substances? 
3. Should the trial court have given an accomplice instruc-
tion? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant was charged with the offense of theft, a third-
degree felony. The substance of the charge is that the defendant 
did receive, retain or dispose of property of another knowing 
that said property had been stolen. 
The matter was heard before jury on the 27th day of November, 
1984. Pursuant to the jury's findings, the defendant was found 
guilty of the offense and sentenced accordingly. 
The state called three witnesses to support their informa-
tion. The first witness, Carl Johnson, was called on behalf of 
the State of Utah, and he testified that on January 13, 1984 he 
was the owner of one air compressor. He testified that he woke 
up one morning at approximately six o'clock and noticed immedi-
ately that his air compressor was missing (T. 6). 
He further testified that he did not authorize the use or 
possession of that air compressor by either Mr. Pierce or Michael 
Adams (T. 6). 
He testified that he purchased the air compressor for the sum 
of $307.00 in 1979. He further testified that he received an 
insurance reimbursement check in the sum of $275.00 (T. 8). 
The property was allegedly taken on January 13, 1984 (T. 10). 
Upon the property being returned to Mr. Johnson, Mr. Johnson 
advised the court that approximately $103.00 worth of damages had 
occurred to the compressor. Said damages included the shroud 
that covered the pulleys that were broken upon the said air 
compressor and other minor things (T. 14). Mr. Johnson also 
further indicated that there was no attempt to remove or alter 
serial numbers, paint the compressor different colors, or alter 
it in any fashion or manner (T. 16 L. 5). 
The second witness called by the State of Utah was Michael 
Adams. Mr. Adams testified that he stole the property on the 
13th of January from Carl Johnson. He was assisted by Mark Ward 
(T. 19-20). Mr. Adams testified that subsequent to the time of 
the theft, he contacted the defendant and the defendant agreed to 
purchase it from Michael Adams (T. 21-22). 
Mr. Adams, pursuant to the questioning of the prosecutor, 
stated that he received compensation for the compressor. The 
prosecutor pursued the questioning of what payment was received 
by Mr. Pierce. Defense counsel objected and subsequently moved 
the court to declare a mistrial. The court, over objection, 
allowed Mr. Adams to testify that he received a bag of marijuana 
in exchange for the air compressor and that the bag of marijuana 
was worth the sum of $100.00 (T. 24. L. 7-17). 
Mr. Adams further testified that he attempted to reobtain 
possession of the air compressor in May. Mr. Pierce had 
completed repairs upon the machine and demanded that he be paid 
$180.00 to return the air compressor • (T. 26). 
The next witness called by the state was Alex Hunt, a Deputy 
Sheriff for Utah County, State of Utah. The officer testified as 
to the discussions between himself and Mr. Adams (T. 39-50). 
Subsequent to the evidence being submitted by the prosecu-
tion, defense counsel motioned the court for a mistrial upon the 
grounds that the defendant was charged with theft by receiving 
and the state had introduced evidence of a separate crime or 
possible crime, distribution of marijuana (T. 52-54). 
Counsel also motioned the court to dismiss the information 
against the defendant based upon the fact that the state had 
failed to properly charge the date of the offense and that the 
case had failed to meet the burden of proof regarding the value 
of property being in excess of $250.00. All motions were denied. 
The defense called as its witnesses Mark Ward, Densil Harvey, 
David Bunker, and the defendant, Richard Pierce. 
Mark Ward testified that he assisted Michael Adams in obtain-
ing the property from Carl Johnson on January 13, 1984 (T. 62). 
Mr. Ward further testified that they approached Mr. Pierce for 
the purchase of the air compressor. Mr. Pierce asked where the 
compressor came from and Mr. Ward and Mr. Adams advised Mr. 
Pierce that it used to be Michael Adams' father's (T. 63 L. 12). 
Mr. Ward advised the court that Mr. Pierce at no time was advised 
that the property was stolen (T. 64 L. 6). They advised Mr. 
Pierce that they had the authority to sell it and the authority 
to sell was from Michael Adams' father (T. 65 L. 14). 
Densil Harvey was called as a witness on behalf of the 
defense as to the value of the property. 
David Bunker testified that he was an employee of Timp Rental 
Agency in Orem, Utah (T. 86). He also testified as to value of 
the compressor (T. 89). 
The defendant testified (T. 93). He advised the court, in 
conformance with Mr. Ward's testimony, that he had no idea or 
belief that the compressor was stolen (T. 94 L. 22-23). Mr. 
Pierce testified that he was not in possession of the compressor 
at the time Mr. Adams requested the compressor be returned but 
that in fact Mr. Pierce had sold it to another person for the sum 
of $180.00 and needed to be paid back the sum of $180.00 before 
he could retrieve the same. 
The state recalled as a rebuttal witness Steve Palont. The 
state further called Sidney Paskett. Both witnesses testified as 
to the value of the compressor. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The state's case rests upon the credibility attached to 
three witnesses: Michael Adams, Mark Ward and Richard Pierce. 
Michael Adams was the thief who stole the property and acted as 
an accomplice to this alleged crime. Two witnesses were called 
to contradict the testimony of Michael Adams: Mark Ward and 
Richard Pierce. Richard Pierce and Mark Ward raised such a 
reasonable doubt as to the testimony of Michael Adams to warrant 
setting aside the verdict of guilty. 
II. The state's case rests upon the testimony of an accom-
plice, Michael Adams. The court failed to instruct the jury 
regarding accomplice testimony, and the court was so required by 
the provisions of 77-17-7, U.C.A. 
III. The state improperly admitted evidence of the defendant 
dealing in marijuana. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE EXISTS 
TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF GUILT 
Defendant submits, as a matter of law, that the jury verdict 
was not supported by sufficient facts to justify the verdict of 
guilt. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled upon whether a jury verdict 
may be set aside. In State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799 (Utah 1977), 
the court stated as follows: 
For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge to the suffi-
ciency of evidence to sustain his conviction, it must appear 
that viewing the evidence and all inferences that may be 
reasonably drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
verdict of the jury, reasonable minds could not believe him 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. To set aside a verdict, it 
must appear that the evidence was so inconclusive or unsatis-
factory that reasonable minds acting fairly must have enter-
tained reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime. 
In the present case, the state's evidence was based upon the 
testimony of Michael Adams, the principal thief in the taking of 
property from Carl Johnson on January 13, 1984. No other 
evidence establishes possession nor the mental state of mind 
requisite for the conviction. The testimony of Carl Johnson 
fails to implicate the defendant in any crime, nor does the 
testimony of Officer Alex Hunt. The sole supporting indictment 
against the defendant is made by Michael Adams. 
The defendant, in his testimony, denied the allegations and 
specifically told the court that he did not know that the 
property had been stolen or that it had probably been stolen. 
In support of defendant's petition, he also called Mark Ward. 
Mr. Ward was the accomplice of Michael Adams in the theft of the 
property from Carl Johnson on January 13. Mr. Ward testified 
that he approached Mr. Pierce to purchase the air compressor. 
Mr. Pierce was advised by Mr. Adams and Mr. Ward that the 
property had not been stolen but in fact the property belonged to 
Mr. Adams' father. 
The evidence incriminating the defendant that was submitted 
by the state was tainted by its source, the thief of the 
property. Such evidence was contradicted by the defendant and 
further by Mr. Adams' accomplice, Mark Ward. Defendant submits 
that such evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
support the conviction. 
POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GIVEN 
THE ACCOMPLICE INSTRUCTION 
Under current law, a conviction may be had on uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice. However, such testimony should be 
viewed with caution. Section 77-17-7, Utah Code Annotated, 
provides as follows: 
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony 
of an accomplice. 
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the 
jury may be given to the effect that such uncorroborated 
testimony should be viewed with caution, and such an instruc-
tion shall be given if the trial judge finds the testimony of 
the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or improb-
able. 
In the present case, Michael Adams was an accomplice to the 
allegation of theft against the defendant [see State v. Taylor, 
570 P.2d 697 (Utah 1977) wherein Utah's theft statute consoli-
dated offenses of larceny and receiving stolen property into a 
single offense of theft]. 
Section 76-2-202 defines an accomplice as follows: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the 
commission of an offense, who directly commits the offense, 
who solicits, requests, commands, encourages or intentionally 
aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an 
offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such 
conduct. 
The sole incriminating evidence offered at trial against the 
defendant was the testimony of accomplice Adams. In direct 
opposition to said testimony, the defendant offered his testimony 
as well as the testimony of accomplice Ward. Such testimony is 
certainly suspect, uncertain or improbable. 
The jury should have been instructed that the uncorroborated 
testimony of an accomplice should be viewed with extreme caution. 
The court should have entered a finding that the testimony of the 
accomplice was uncertain and/or improbable and thereby given the 
instruction to the jury [see §77-17-7(2), U.C.A., supra]. No 
instruction was given to the jury. No findings were made. 
In People v. Baker (1982), 110 111. App. 3d 1015, 66 111. 
Dec. 587, 443 N.E.2d 270, the Supreme Court of the State of 
Illinois reversed the conviction of a defendant where the trial 
court refused to give instructions cautioning the jury that an 
accomplice testimony was .subject to suspicion. 
In the instant case, the court failed to provide the instruc-
tion and the conviction should be reversed. The court was 
required by the provisions of Section 77-17-7(2) to make appro-
priate findings and submit the cautionary accomplice instruction. 
POINT III 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY ADMITTED 
EVIDENCE OF OTHER CRIMES 
Rule 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in paragraph 
(b) as follows: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to 
prove the character of a person in order to show that he 
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissi-
ble for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
In the present case, the defendant was charged with the 
offense of theft by receiving, in that he received, retained, or 
disposed of property of another knowing it had been stolen or 
believing that it probably had been stolen with the purpose to 
deprive the owner thereof. The evidence admitted by the state 
that the defendant paid to Michael Adams $100.00 worth of 
marijuana was irrelevant to the issues before the court. 
Rule 401 of the Rules of Evidence defines relevancy as 
follows: 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. 
Even in the case where evidence may be argued to be relevant, 
evidence should be excluded if the probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, misleading the jury or other considerations. See 
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
In the present situation, the evidence of distribution of 
marijuana had no relevance to the issues of guilt or innocence of 
the charge of theft, but was introduced solely to indict the 
defendant as a person dealing in marijuana. 
In State v. Saunders, 7 U.A.R. 19, 699 P.2d 738 (1985), this 
court reviewed the case of a defendant who had been convicted of 
burglary, theft and possession of a firearm by a restricted 
person and in addition, a habitual criminal charge. The defen-
dant had been accused of offenses in connection with an April 
1982 incident in which a home in Sandy, Utah was broken into and 
various property, including firearms, were stolen. 
Before trial, the defense counsel moved to sever the firearm 
count from the remaining charge. The motion was denied, thereby 
allowing the state to introduce evidence of other crimes by route 
of the charge of "possession of a firearm by a restricted 
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person." Trial on the burglary, theft and firearms counts 
proceeded before a jury. 
The primary evidence against the defendant was a testimony of 
Stacy Williams, who was granted immunity in exchange for his 
testimony. Williams testified that he and the defendant broke 
into the home and took the property. The defendant did not 
testify. However, the defendant did stipulate that at the time 
of the alleged offenses he was an inmate at the Utah State 
Prison, housed in a halfway house. The jury convicted the defen-
dant of burglary, theft, and possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person. The defendant was then tried by the court on 
the habitual criminal charge. 
The court held that by denying defendant's motion to sever, 
the trial court allowed the jury to consider evidence of the 
defendant's prior crime as a basis for an inference that he 
committed the burglary and theft; an inference the rules are 
intended to prevent. 
Rule 55 of the former Rules of Evidence governing the case 
provided: 
Evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a 
specified occasion is inadmissible to prove his disposition 
to commit a crime or civil wrong as a basis for an inference 
that he committed another crime or civil wrong on another 
separate occasion, but . . . such evidence is admissible when 
relevant to prove some other material fact . . . 
The court concluded that the evidence that the defendant was 
incarcerated in the Utah State Prison was not admissible 
evidence, not relevant thereby, to the charges of burglary and 
theft. 
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In the present situation, evidence of the defendant's payment 
to the state witness Michael Adams of marijuana for the compres-
sor was inadmissible. The only inference this evidence had was 
to show a criminal disposition as the basis for the undue infer-
ence that he was guilty of the charge of theft by receiving. 
CONCLUSION 
This case represents a conviction based upon the credibility 
attached to three witnesses: Michael Adams, Mark Ward, and 
Richard Pierce. 
The testimony of Michael Adams should be viewed with caution. 
The jury should have been so advised. 
The state's case balanced solely upon the believability of 
Mr. Adams. When so viewed, the testimony of a marijuana exchange 
even further heightens the potential for undue prejudice and 
aggravates the potential for improper conviction. The jury was 
asked to believe a thief, or the testimony of an accomplice and 
the defendant, who the jury was told also sells marijuana. The 
potential for undue prejudice and inferences exists and the 
evidence should have been excluded. 
DATED this &C7 day of February, 1986. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed four copies of the foregoing 
to David L. Wilkinson, Utah State Attorney General, Attorney for 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84114, postage prepaid, this cK^ day of February, 1986. 
